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6Conclusions
This study has clarified various non-price factors that influence the production
incentives of small-scale cocoa producers in southern Ghana. It has also
sought to contribute to an understanding of historical changes in cocoa-pro-
ducing villages. Analytical focus has been on three points: the pattern of
resource access and resource use of farmers, indigenous institutions influencing
production incentives, and the power relationships involved in smallholder
production. By adopting analytical methodology which starts with the indi-
vidual farmers (not the household or any other social groups), the study has
sought to reveal the economic stratification and unequal power relations among
farmers.
As stated in Chapter 1, the study has two objectives. First is to identify the
broad incentive structures embedded in local institutions. In other words, the
study has reconsidered the role of price incentives, which has been greatly
emphasized in recent literature, by placing it in wider incentive structures that
are interrelated with social and institutional aspects of agricultural produc-
tion. Second is to describe some aspects of rural transformation in Ghana by
comparing the situation of cocoa-producing villages in the 1990s with that
described in earlier studies. These two points will be summarized in this
concluding chapter.
1. Aspects of Incentive Structures in Cocoa Production
Higher real producer prices of cocoa enhance farmer incentives to produc-
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tion. However, prices are not the only factor to provide incentives to farmers
and govern their production behavior. Various non-price incentives also affect
this behavior. These include incentives embedded in local institutions such as
agrarian contracts and indigenous land tenure systems. The micro-level incen-
tive structures are also interrelated with macro-level changes, such as increas-
ing population and the decreasing availability of land. The interrelations be-
tween price incentives, non-price incentives, and macro-level changes are
summarized below.
The two types of share contracts widely practiced in Ghanaian cocoa pro-
duction are important in understanding the incentive structures of smallholders.
As was detailed in Chapter 2, the yemayenkye and nhwesoo share contracts
provide both landlords and tenants with various incentives that are often
related to the villagers’ life cycles and their varied socioeconomic situations.
By entering either form of share contract, a tenant obtains access to land for
food crops. A yemayenkye tenant acquires a stable and inheritable usufruct
right of land, and may even have an opportunity to become a landholding
farmer. When landlord supervision is weak, a tenant may underreport the total
harvest, enjoying a higher production incentive and, simultaneously, a risk-
sharing arrangement with the landlord. On the other hand, the two types of
share contract provide landlords with flexibility, allowing them to choose
contracts appropriate to their different socioeconomic situations. An own-
account farmer who plans to expand cocoa farms may leave the already-
established farm to the nhwesoo tenant. A retiring farmer who intends to go
back to the hometown may enter a nhwesoo or yemayenkye contract in order
to secure income after retirement while maintaining the landholding rights.
An absentee landlord may plan to earn a certain income without working him/
herself by holding cocoa farms under a yemayenkye contract. Thus, the two
types of share contracts provide flexibility to both landlords and tenants,
enabling them to choose contracts appropriate to their different socioeco-
nomic situations.
Another important factor influencing farmer incentive structures is the com-
plex interaction between rights in trees (or farms) and rights in land. As the
cases of yemayenkye show, once a farm is established and well-managed by a
tenant, his landlord cannot easily challenge the usufruct right of the tenant.
Continual investment into the farm under yemayenkye could even lead to the
transfer of land to the tenant. This means that tenant investment in cocoa, a
perennial tree yielding a crop for some forty years, is also an act strengthening
tenant land rights. Similar patterns can be observed not only for tenants of
share contracts but for own-account farmers as well. This is because in Ghana
as in many farming communities in Africa, the existence of multiple and
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overlapping interests in land is prevalent, and investment in tree crops may act
as a means of claiming and enhancing one’s land rights (Besley 1995; Sjaastad
and Bromley 1997; Okoth-Ogendo 1989; Bruce 1988; Berry 1988a, 1988b;
Otsuka et al. 1998). Therefore, farmer investment behavior needs to be under-
stood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term
incentive to strengthen land rights.
The role of price incentive in cocoa production needs to be reconsidered by
placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions. Be-
cause maintaining cocoa farms is an important way for farmers to strengthen
and secure their land rights, a fall in the real producer price of cocoa, as
happened in the 1970s and the early 1980s, might have less effect on produc-
tion behavior than is usually assumed.1 For a yemayenkye tenant, neglecting
the cocoa farm or cutting down cocoa trees to replace them with more profitable
crops means a loss of long-term and inheritable usufruct right to the land. For
a landholding farmer it means the loss of visible evidence that proves the
investment he has put into the land and his entitlement to occupy it. On the
other hand, when the real producer price rises, as was the case in the late
1980s, the price incentive and other incentives embedded in local institutions
may strengthen each other, resulting in a stronger production effect than the
one caused by the price incentive alone. The social and institutional aspects of
incentives, and their interaction with other “pure” economic aspects such as
price incentive, all constitute wider incentive structures that affect farmer
behavior.
Furthermore, this “combined” incentive structure of prices and institutions
can be affected by the wider situation of increasing population and the result-
ant scarcity of land in southern Ghana. The decrease in forest land and the
resultant difficulty in obtaining unoccupied land from local chiefs, a situation
not very critical some decades ago, can encourage farmers to enter share
contracts using a landlord’s uncultivated land as an alternative means of
obtaining land right. This results in both more efficient use of otherwise
uncultivated land and in an increase in production. The favorable price incen-
tive in the late 1980s may have accelerated this process. Thus the incentive
structures of Ghanaian cocoa farmers are formed through the complex inter-
action between price incentives, non-price incentives embedded in local insti-
tutions, and the increasing scarcity of land in rural southern Ghana.
2. Transformation of Cocoa-Producing Villages
From the analysis in this study, it has become possible to shed light on some
aspects of the transformation taking place in rural southern Ghana. In earlier
literature the cocoa-producing villages until around 1960 were characterized
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by the existence of capitalistic farmers who reinvest their profits from cocoa to
acquire large plots of land. In the 1990s, however, there is little evidence of
such capitalistic farmers. Similarly, we do not find evidence of a bipolariza-
tion among farmers into a class of large landholders and another of landless
wage laborers. The following three reasons appear to explain the nonexistence
of such classes.
First, the rapid expansion of cocoa production over the entire area of south-
ern Ghana during the first half of the twentieth century has now made it
impossible for farmers to acquire large pieces of land from the traditional
chiefs. With a decrease in uncultivated land and increase in population pres-
sure, land has become scarce. This has made it increasingly difficult for
capitalist farmers to expand their operations by acquiring more land. The
tendency that land once acquired by individuals or lineages is rarely sold to
strangers has made it even more difficult for individuals to accumulate land.
Second, there are trends toward the fragmentation of land and the disper-
sion of landholding rights with generational change. This occurs as a result of
the gifting and inheritance of land and land-dividing arrangements under the
yemayenkye contract. With many people (notably wives, offspring, and matri-
lineal kin) laying claim to their land rights, the land acquired by first-genera-
tion migrants has been divided into smaller pieces through gifting and inherit-
ance. One result of this process has been the decrease in land area held by
individual farmers. Another result has been the increasing dispersion of land
rights to persons outside of lineages, through gifts and inheritance to non-
lineage members. The frequent division of land under the yemayenkye con-
tract also has contributed to this process of land fragmentation and dispersion.
Third, local institutions such as indigenous land tenure systems and agrar-
ian contracts allow individuals with low economic status to improve their
economic position with the progress in their life cycle. Because of the exist-
ence of various agrarian contracts, even a landless farmer can seize the oppor-
tunity to switch to a more advantageous form of contract. In addition, increas-
ing cases of yemayenkye contracts in recent years have lead to the emergence
of new landholders who were once landless. The position of farmers with low
economic status, especially landless ones, can be improved, and there does
exist the institutional means for such improvement.
The socioeconomic transformation of migrant cocoa-producing villages is
closely linked to the life cycle and generational change of farmers. When first
generation migrants acquired land directly from the traditional chiefs and
launched cocoa production, they could reinvest cocoa income to purchase
uncultivated land that was available. By the time they grew old and retired to
their hometowns, little uncultivated land remained available. When retiring,
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the first-generation farmers consigned their land to tenants under yemayenkye
contracts, setting off a slow process of land division and dispersion to landless
farmers. At the same time, land transfers from the first to subsequent genera-
tions through gifting or inheritance also began. About forty years after the first
migrants started cocoa production, these processes of land fragmentation and
the dispersion of landholding rights to people outside lineage were beginning.
The two villages of Bepoase and Nagore were in such a state when fieldwork
was conducted in the mid 1990s. The situation in the two villages could be
called “the first stage” of land fragmentation and dispersion.
Now more than sixty years after the first-generation migrants settled in the
villages, the process of land fragmentation and dispersion is in its “second
stage.” At this stage there are no first-generation migrants alive, and many of
their descendants live outside the villages. As a result, the number of absentee
landlords, who inherited land from the first-generation migrants but have not
resided within the villages, is increasing. This is leading to an increasing
number of share tenants and those who acquire small pieces of land through
land-dividing arrangements under yemayenkye contracts. At this stage of later
generations, land becomes scarcer than in the “first stage” because of the
increasing population. In addition, land becomes more fragmented and dis-
persed because of the further subdivision of land through gifting and inherit-
ance. Generational change is bringing the same transition among tenants
because the number of second-generation tenants who inherit yemayenkye
contracts is increasing. The village of Gyaha at the time of fieldwork seemed
to be in this second stage of land fragmentation and dispersion.
Thus, the situation of cocoa-producing villages in Ghana in the 1990s
greatly differs from that in the 1960s or earlier as described in the past
literature. Capitalistic farmers accumulating land which is readily and plenti-
fully available have faded away because of the growing scarcity of land.
Meanwhile the generational change of cocoa farmers has lead to land frag-
mentation and dispersion which has been further accelerated by the increasing
number of land-dividing yemayenkye contracts. The situation seems to be
bringing about the leveling, rather than bipolarization, of landholdings among
farmers.
At this point there are some questions that naturally come to mind. What
will happen in the future when the land held by individuals becomes even
smaller under greater population pressure, making it difficult to divide land
further under yemayenkye contracts or through gifting and inheritance? Will
there be a renewed trend toward polarization between the landholding class
and the landless? What institutional and technological changes will arise in
such a situation? The cocoa-producing villages in southern Ghana, which
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have undergone a major transformation over the past century, can be expected
to change further in the future.
Note
1 During this period, the low producer price of cocoa in Ghana resulted in large-
scale smuggling to Togo and Côte d’Ivoire. Consequently, production figures
during this period as reported in the official statistics (which only include cocoa
sold to the state-owned purchasing company) could have been much lower than
the actual production that took place in Ghana. Therefore, the explanation that the
decline in real producer price during this period eroded farmer incentives to
produce and led to a lower level of production could be exaggerated.
